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Introduction
The 1991 Gulf War was fought ostensibly to protcct the principle of
State sovereignty. States, specifically those which were members of
the United Nations, could not be invaded, occupied and annexed by
more powerful neighbours.
On 6 April 1991, Iraq agreed to a cease-fire though protesting its
unjust conditions. The previous day, by a vote of 1F3, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 688, denouncing the Iraqi repression of
the Kurds and calling on all member countries to contribute to
humanitarian elforts on their behalf. Within a matter of days, the
suppression of the Kurdish rebellion was completed by Saddam Hus-
sein, and nearly two million Kurds had fled.
Eventually, Britain, France and the United States intervened in
northern Iraq to create a safe haven to which the Kurds could return.
The same countries that had fought a war to protect the principle of
the sovereig"ty and territorial integrity of States, now challenged the
sovereignty of Iraq by intervening in a matter of ostensible domestic
jurisdiction, and in a way that could potentially lead to the disintegra-
tion of the territorial integrity of lraq.
The earlier expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait was a military
intervention by a multilateral force authorized by the UN. The later
protective humanitarianr intervention also used the military, but in a
* P-fcs*. of Philorophy and Dircctor of thc Centrc for Refugcc Studica, Yort Univcrsity,
Toronto.I Pregident Bu.sh, in his prcss confcrcncc announcing American agneemenr to participatc in
providing rclief campl for the Kunds within the tcrritory of haq, was at grcat pains to strcas irs
'humanitarian' purpocc ac authorized by Sccurity Council Resolution 688, since without guch
campa rclidopcrations in the nonhern mountpiru of lraq wcrc impossiblc on thc scale nceded.
Consistcnt with United Nation.s Sccurity Council Resolution 688, and wurking clecly with the
United Nations and other intcrnational rclief oqganizations and our Eumpcan partners, I havc
defensive manner; it was a multilateral action undertaken by three
States rather than over thirty and uiiluut the cxplbit authorization of
the Security Council. On I April, as the Kurdish revolt was being
ruthlessly crushed, two of the West's Arab allies, Assad of Syria and
Mubarak of Egypt met; they announced opposition to the splintering
of lraq, and Assad stated, 'What is happening in lraq is an internal
matter'.2 Yet, after Bush's initial hesilation at the prospect of the
possible 'Lebanonization' of Iraq and notwithstanding their stated
priority of preventing Iraqi ftagmentation,s the British, French and
Americans put troops into northern Iraq to induce the Kurds to
return and to provide for their relief and protection.
Within just a few months two unprecedented initiatives had been
taken in the post Cold War world, one to reinforce the sacred
principle of State sovereignty and one which many would argue
underrnines that principle. This article is concerned with the latter.
l. Historical and Conceptual Background
f.f Kurds
The Kurdish population is estimated at 20 million, and is divided
among four States in the region, constituting lL24o/" of the Turkish
population,2S-27o/o of the Iraqi population, lfl6% of the Iranian
population and 8-9% of the Syrian population.{ The Kurds speak two
major dialects and are overwhelmingly Sunni. In the rural areas,
there are also differences between Kurds who live in the plains and
foothills, where large landlords control the economy, and the moun-
tainous Kurds, where tribal control predominates in the largely
pastoral economy, though ownership of land has becn more recently
dirccted the U.S. military to bcgin immcdiatcly to establish scvcral cncrmpmcnt! in nortlrcrn
Iraq, whcrc rclicf supplicc for thesc reftgces will bc made availablc in large guantitica and
dirtributcd in an orderly way.' (Thc Nao Yor* Tina, 17 Apr. 1991, A7) Though the army was
bcing uscd bccaurc of tltc massive nature of t}rc problcm, thc isruc of pmtection was not ignored.
'Adequatc sccurity wiil bc provided at thoac sitco by U.S., Britilh and French ground forccr,
consistcnt with the Unitcd Nationr Resolution 688.' Bush cellcd on othcr memberg of thc
coalition to participatc. Hc also insistcd that, 'We intcnd to turn ovcr thc administration of and
sccurity for tlrcsc sitcs as roon e! po*rible (the sooner the bctter as hc rcsponded to a later
qucrtion) to thc United Nationr.'
2 Tltc Naa Yo* Titrut, rcport by Yousscf M. Ibrahim, 2 Apr. 1991, A4.t Thomar L. Fricdman, Nao Yot*, Tim.t, + Apr. 1991, front pagc. sce also articlc by Elainc
Sciolino in the lVara Yorh Tinrs, l8 Apr. l99l (A6). Bwh was reluctant on four counts. Hc did not
want to: fucl Kurdish scparatism, contribute to thc dismcmbcrmcnt of lraq, sct a dangcrou.r
preccdcnt for intcrfcrcncc in the internal affairs of sovcreign Statcr, recommit Amcrican ground
forccs on kaqi tcrritory. Agairut thosc conccrns wcrc thc incffcctivcncrs of the United Nations
and privatc relief organizations in thc face of thc massivc sizc of thc problem and the inacccssi-
bility of thc sitca for largc scale relicf opcrations and the fcar of long tcrm dcstabilization for
Turkcy.
+ Cfl David McDowall, Thc Kurfu. [.ondon: Minority Rights Group Rcport, No. 23, 1985.
vested in tribal leaders. A rural to urban movement has also occurred,
with large numbers of Kurds living in cities and forming professional
and managerial roles. But in spite of the wide divergencies amongst
Kurds in four different countries, in very different geographical
regions, speaking difilerent dialects, a Kurdish nationalist movcment
has long been active in the whole region.
Sheik Ubaydallah, the grandhther of Kurdish nationalism, was
active in the 1880s, thereby defining the Kurdish nationalist move-
ments as one of the older ones in the modern world.
The Treaty of SEvres of l0 August 1920 with Turkey, following
World War I, provided the Kurds with, 'an absolute unmolested
opportunity to autonomous development' in the words of Point 12 of
Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points. The provision was never
implemented. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, totally
ignored the claims of Kurds arrd divided the remaining Kurdish ter-
ritory between Iraq and Iran. Chaliand blames the western interest in
oil for the denial of recognition for Kurdish nationalism. A League of
Nations Commission recommended that Kurdish territory remain
part of Iraq, despite recognition that ethnicity should properly yield a
separate Kurdish State. The rationale was the need to ensure the
economic viability of lraq.
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, a traditional leader and the father of
Iraqi Kurdish nationalism, was expelled to Iran after World War II.
He returned in l95B when the rights of Kurds were first recognized
following the coup by General Qasim and the ct eation of the new
Iraqi republic. The autonomy of Kurds was based on a narelve point
programme, but the government fell before they could be implemen-
ted. On I I March 1970, following a decade of conflict at a cost of
60,000 casualties and 300,000 displaced, an agreement was signed
with the Ba'th regime, which provided for Kurdish autonomy.5 The
agreement promised official recognition of the Kurdish language in
Kurdish arcas, non-discrimination, affirmative action, administrative
autonomy, equal economic developrnent, repatriation, and, most
important of all, the official recognition that Iraq was constituted of
two principal nationalities-Arabs and Kurds who are recognized as
having national as well as minority rights, including guaranhcd ights to
sclf-ru\c, proportionate representation in the Iraqi legislature and the
Vice-Presidency olthe republic. The agreement broke down after four
years over disputes over the control of oil revenues and the territorial
boundaries of the autonomous region.
On I I March 1974,Iraq promulgated Act No. 33. It was passed
without Banani's concurrence because the Act weakened the 1970
5 Cf. tr{artin Short and Anthony N{cDcrmott, Tfu Kurds london: Ivlinority Rights Group
Repon, No.23, 1975.
Iagreement and left critical disputes over oil revenues and the
boundaries of the autonomous region unresolved. The Act provided
for a regional administrativc autonomous regime possessing only those
powers specifically delegated by the State, with a subsidiary legal and
financial system within the framework of the legal, political and econ-
omic unity of the Republic of Iraq. It also provided for recognition of
both Kurdish and Arabic as rcgiorwl olficial languages.6 Barzani
turned to Israel for support, Soviet support having previously been
withdrawn, and a new rebellion began.
The revolt was put down in 1975 at a cost of 50,000 killed and
600,000 displaced. Guerilla war resumed in 1979. In 1988, following
the end of Iran-Iraq war, thousands of Kurds were killed, poison gas
against the Hallabja population allegedly kitled 5,000, and 100,000
Kurds were relocated to 'strategic hamlets'.
Following the defeat of thc lraqi arrny and the withdrawal from
Kuwait in 1991, uprisings again took place in the north and the south
of Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. Both rebellions
were quickly put down with the use of napalm and helicopter gun-
ships against both rebels and civilians. In the north military action
was again accompanied by harsh repression of the local population.
The memories and the fear of mass slaughter among the Kurds were
strong; they recalled the chemical weapons used to wipe out 5,000
men, women and children in Halabja only three years earlier, in
l9BB.? The widespread support for the rebellion among the Kurds, the
severity of the Iraqi repression, and the memory of the wanton
slaughter of innocent civilians by Saddam Hussein's regime led to
panic and a mass exodus of up to two million Kurds and flight into the
mountains towards the Turkish and lranian borders. Turkey claimed
the harsh repression was a deliberate measure by Iraq to create a
mass exodus and empty the country's northern territories of an
unwanted minority.s
When the Turks would not let the Kurds into Turkey, despite
foreign and domestic pressure on the government of Ankara, includ-
ing a call from the U.S., the plight of up to a million Kurds, sruck,
starving and exposed in the freezing mountains and inhospitable ter-
rain of northern Iraq,e compelled international action to initiate a safe
6 haq claims tlat it proteca minoritics othcr than the nadonalist Kurds bccausc it has
incorporated lcgal provisions for scparatc religious courts for Armenians, fusyrians, Chaldcans
and Jcwr with rcspcct to tJrcir pcrsond status (marriagc, divorcc, burial, child naming, etc.),(Unitcd Nations Sub-Commission on Prcvcntion and Protection of Minoritics, Rporr: UN doc.
CCPR/C/l/Add.a5 (1978), p. l2)
1 Cf. Nas YmkTimu,26 Apr. 1991, Al and A4 (intervicws with Kurdish rcfugees and relicl
officials indicating the importance of thc mcmory of that previous slaughtcr).I Clyde Habcrman rcporting from Antara, Turkcy, Ncw York ftrut:12 Apr. lggl.
e The Torcato Star,N Apr. l99l; fuIoCa fuFrt, Vol. XII, No. 3/4, March/April l9gl.
enclave program in the north. Though the Iraqis officially rejected the
action as an intervention in its domestic affairs,'u the Iraqi arrny
gcnerally did not challenge the British, French and Americans who
built the camps for the Kurds. The Kurds began to return from the
mountains. Their leaders, with Jalal Talabani, the son of Mustafa
Barzani, apparently to the fore, once again negotiated their autonorny
from the Baghdad administration.rr On 18 M"y, the Kurdish rebel
chiefs announced that they had reached an agreement in principle on
a 20-point plan to introduce democracry to lraq with separation of the
Ba'th party from the State, free elections and a multiparty svstem.
Differences remained, however, on the old sticking point-would the
boundaries of the region include or excludc the Kirkuk oil-producing
region; the Kurds seemed prepared this time to leave the control of
thi oil revenues in the hands of the central government.r2
The question for this paper, is whether the humanitarian inter-
vention by Britain, France and the United States was justified? Were
they, in fact, ethically and legally obligcd to intervene? And what
is the extent and the limits which might characterize such an
intervention?
r0 The Europcan Community propooal for a safc havcn, which callcd for Unitcd Nationr
supcrvirion (cf. rcport of Yousscf M. Ibrahim, Nao Yo* Taw4 lO Apr. 1991, A6), was welcomcd
by Massoud Barzani, the Kurdich leadcr ar 'a grcat humanitarian gcsture' but denounccd by
Iraq as'a plot against lraq's rcvereignty'. Thc lcgal ba.ris for thc proposal was'the protcction of
a population fiom pcrrccution' in the wondr ofJohn Major, Primc Minicter of Britain, undcr the
UN 1948 Convention on tlrc Prcvcntion and Punishmcnt of thc Crime of Genocide. Aniclc 8
allowa 'compctcnt organr of thc Unitcd Nations to tale ruch action under thc Chartcr of the
Unitcd Nations as they consider appropriate for thc prwention and supprcerion of actr of
gcnocidc.' lt matcr na provision for a multilatcral initiative. Thc baqi Forcign Ministcr, Ahmcd
Husscin Khudaycr, in a letter to Secrrtery Gcnsral of thc Unitcd Nations, Javicr Pcrez dc
Cuellar, denouncc{ thc allicd camp! iu '& rcrious, unjurtifiable and unfounded attacl on thc
rovcreignty and territorial integrity of kaq.' (Ncu Yotk Tittlrt,2+ Apr. 1991, A6)
rr Minority righrs arc not thc s:rmc ar autonomy. Minority righu indudc thc right to citizcn-
ship in thc dominant Statc, thc right to cqual treatment by that State and undcr the law, thc
right to thc cnuenchmcnt of those minoriry rights in Statc law, thc right to rctain aad nohtah the
minority language and thc right to maintain onc's own schools supponcd by the Statc to thc
sarne dcgrec as thc majority population, though govcrncd by requirements about a corc cur-
riculum and comrnon standards, Autonomy includes the qcrcisc of administrative rclf-govern-
ancc on thc political level of municipal funaions, or prcvindal status which 6ivcs thc minoriry
limitcd politicat sovercignty in cuch are"" as cducation, hcoltlr, wclfarc, limitcd taxation powcn,
economic dcvelopmcnt powcn, ctc., but ccnainly cxcludcc forcign atrairs and dcfencc. Justicc
Jules Dcsch€ner defined a minority entidcd to minority rights ar followr: 'A group of citizrns of a
Statc, constituting a numerical minority aad in a nondominant pocition in that State, endowcd
with cthnic, rcligiour or linguietic charactcrirtics which dillcr from thocc of the majority of thc
population, having a 3€ruc of solidarity with onc anothcr, motivatcd, if only implicidy, by a
collcctivc will to survivc and whosc aim ir to achicvc cquality with thc majority in fact and in
law.' (Julcs Dcschena, Prcptal Conuntdg a Dt@bn oJ tlu um 'Mitbnt\ UN doc E/CN.
4/Sub.2/1985/31 & Corr. I (1985), p. 30 as quoted in Hunt Hannum, Autowntl, Sovnigay, aed
Hf-Detnieatim: Tlu Acanntodatin of Corfu*E fr?,frr. Philadclphia: Univenity of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1990, p.61.fr Rcutcrs, Torotto Star, 19 May 1991, A2.
1.2 Refirgeer
Traditionally, tJrere are only three options for hclping refugees. One is
resettlement abroad, an option left in abeyance, if not dismissed
outright, in the case of the Kurds, because of the large nu.mbers and
the current influx of refugees into the devclopcd world already in
process. Moreover, resettling the Kurds would play into Saddam
Hussein's hands, allowing him to get rid of a large national minority
hostile to his regime. Kurdish nationalists opposed resettlement for
that reason. The refugees and the major countries of resettlement
were united on this general poliry, though, in practice, some Kurds
would be allowed to resettle in countries likc Canada and the United
States, for example, to join family members under regular immigra-
tion programmes.
A second option is settlement in the countries of first asylum.
Turkey, with its own Kurdish population of eleven million and with
its own history of Kurdish rebellions and severe repression,ls adam-
antly opposed permitting the Kurds to enter Turkey, either for
temporary refuge or zrs a p€nnanent solution. In fact, relatively small
groups were perrnitted to enter or forced themselves in to obtain some
temporary relief. For a short period, Turkey considered allowing
Kurds in on a tanporary Dans provided their resettlement abroad was
guaranteed on the same basis as the developed world took in
Southeast Asian refugees in the late seventies and early eighties. This
suggestion was rejected by resettlement countries such as Canada.
Iran, a country already host to about two million Afghans and several
hundred thousand Iraqi $hiites, was more open to allowing the Kurds
to cross the border for tanparary relief,'* a response which initially
received minimal support from the West.15 As Roger Winter, Director
of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, rernarked to the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Alfairs on 23 April 1991, 'Iran
is the only one of the countries bordering Iraq that has-to date-
acted in a consistent, admirable humanitarian fashion.'
The third option, traditionally conceived, is repatriation. But
repatriation presumes that the refugees are outsidt their country of
origin. The Kurds in Iran were, but those massed on the Turkish
border, and of most concern to both the humanitarians and the for-
rl 
"Iurlcy clmcd irs southcrn border ycstcrday to an cstimated 200,000 Kurd.s flccing an
onslaught by lraqi forcts,' DianaJcan Schemo reported from Diyarbalir, Turley: Tonnlo Star,4
Apr. 1991.f{ Hugh Pain of the Reurcrr Newr Agencry from Haj Omran, Iraq. (Toronto, Ghbc ard Mait,
f 5 Apr. l99l). On 8 Apr. 1991, thc Nao Yo* Tbrut rtportcd that Iran was dcing its bordcr, but
thc clocurc provcd to bc only tcmporary.
15 On | 7 Apr. 1991, Canada announccd an additional $8.5 million in emcrgcncy aid, moct for
lnn (Ghh urd Moil,18 Apr. l99l).
eign policy analysts and practitioners ot Kealpolitik, were not. They
had fled from their homes in Iraq into the freezing mountains, but
they were still within the borders of Iraq. They could not be repatri-
ated to a country which they had not left. Repatriation had either to
be redefined as the return of the refugees to their homes from one
place in Iraq to another, making the sense of the term, rc patia,
absurd, or a fourth option had to be conceived, the return of an
intrnall) displaced population to their homes while safety and security
was provided within their own country. But the postwar refugee lexi-
con defined refugees, quite aside from the ordinary language meaning
which adamantly refused to enjoin such a theoretical distinction, as
those who had been forced to leave and were ozlside the borders of
their country.
Resettlement was an option developed for a relatively small portion
of the world's refugee population,
impractical for any mass exodus.
asylurn was physically impossible
and is one increasingly viewed as
Settlement in the countries of first
lor those refused entry into Turkey
and politically impossible for those who had entered lran. Repatri-
ation is the preferred UNHCR option for all refugees, and seemed to
be the only real option in the case of the Kurds in Iran.
Unfortunately, though it is said to be preferred, that preference is
often only rhetorical while hundreds of thousands of refugees are left
to waste their lives away in 'temporary' refugee camps. Repatriation
was not an option for Kurdish refugees still within Iraq, and circum-
stances dcmanded a new approach. The legal fiction that the inter-
nally displaced were not 'refugees' within the responsibility of the
international community could no longer be sustained.16
15 Onc approach is to reconsidcr thc international rcfugcc regime in tcrms of itg fundamental
conceptions. Thus, attenrpts arr made to rrcvaluate the classical 'defnition' which helpcd crcatc
that conccptual framework for refugee polica; sec, for examplc, J. Hathaway, Tht Ldw of kfucc
Saars, l99l; Carle Ortiz Miranda, 'Toward a Broader Dcfinition of Rcfugcc: 20th Ccntury
Dcvclopment Trendl', 20 Cal. WcsI, In!. IaoJ.3l5-32i (1989-90); Scott W. Penrzcr, 'Refugees
After the Cold War RethinLing tlre Definition from thc Roman Catholic Perspcctive', United
Statcs Catholic Confcrcnce Migration and Refugec Scrvices, April, l99l; Andrcw Shacknovc,
'Who is a Rcfugcc?', Etrtrcr, Chicago: Univcrsiry of Chicago Prcss, 1985. Thil is to be dis-
tinguirhcd from the c-onccprual foundation for rwiring the international regime, Pcntzcr, for
example, attac&s thc conccptual prcmisc ofa sovcrrign Statc system basd on thc sclf-interclB of
Stata (cf, Noycs E. Lcech, C,ovey T. Olivcr and Joscph Ir{. Swecncy, Tfu Intanatwul bgal
Sltlcnt: Cat s dnd Mdlduk. Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Prcss, 1973; Richand B.Lillich, Ifu
Hwaa Righls ol Alicns in Cnunftary Intaraliorol lano. Dovcr, H.H.: Manchestcr Univcrsity
Prcss, 1984) in favour of analyzing thc rcfugcc rcgimc lrom the pcrspcctivc of t]rc common good.
The 'rcfugcc dcfinition' may bc the point of entry, but the conceptual foundation for the attack is
bascd on a tran$nationalist moral pcrspective'without rcference to practical constraints on the
international meanr of assistancr to thocc who may fall within the mandatc: (p. 29) and with
rcfercnce to'a univcrsal moral standard'which is esscntial to improving rcfugce policy'. (p. 22)
What is that standand? 'Women and mcn have thc right to crws borders to sccure rightr
csscntial to the prtscrv'ation of human digniry. (d. David SJ. Hollenbadr, Claimt u Corfict:
ntlriloisg aad Rauoittg thc Cathotic Hmat Righlt Tradilioa. New York: Paulist Prcss, 1979) Wo*,
1.3 Non-Intelvention, Sovereigot,' and Self-Determination
Three concepts-sovereignty, self-deterrnination and non-interven-
tion-must be explained. Sovereignty has been perceived to mean
absolute control of the territory and internal affairs of a country by the
government of that country, however that government obtained
power and no matter what it did with that power with respect to its
own citizens.rT At the very minimum, sovereignty entails the abitity
by the governrnent of that State to use coercive power within the
territory under its authority and jurisdiction.tB
Self-detcrmination is a property of a people as a whole (or, in a
dilferent context, of individuals), not of governments. It is the right of
a people to decide its goals, the rules by which it will achieve those
goals and the methods to be utilized, and to bear the consequences of
its actions. It is related to sovereignty when self-determination is
applied to freedom from colonial rule and from foreign intervention.rs
Sovereignty, as traditionally perceived, is the Weberian notion that
the State has the monopoly on the control of coercive power intended
to protect citizens from one another and from threats from other
States, even though often used on the State's own citizens. Self-
determination is about the locus of freedom, rather than thc locus of
power.
as wcll a.s freedom from pcnccution, civil war, faminc, and the eflects of natural disastcr are all
esscntial human necds.' (p. 28) In other words, refugecs are to be dcfined in terms of economic
and social rights and not just protcctivc civil and political righa (d. louig Henhin,'Intcrna.
tional Human Rights as "Rights"',in Human Rights, d. J. Roland Pennock andJohn W.
Chapman, New Yorl: New York University Prcss, t98l; Elizabcth Clarl Reiss, 'Thc Economic
Rcfugcc', ACVAPS: Fan Morcgrapfu. Ncw Yorh: Council on Rcligious and Intcrnational Alfairs,
1985), but, at the samc tirnc, tie'bagic human needs'approach still definca a refugce as someonc
crossing a bordcr. In other wor&, t}re soverrign State is still the ultimatc rcfcrcncc trccausc, to
bc a rcfugce onc must havc fled the authority and tcrritory of that sovereign State and now
becomc the rcrponsibility of transnational cthical acton.
17 Thomas M. Franck, Nerv York University, doubtcd whcther the crcation of safe havens in
northern kaq was legal without a more explicit Unitcd Nations sanction; Allan Gcrson, Chicf
Counscl to thc Unitcd Statcs Micaion to the United Nations, dcfendcd rhc lcgaliry becausc the
Wcstern Statcs werc 'occupying powcrs'. W. Michacl Reisman, Yalc, justified the obligation
and thc rigtrt of humanitarian intcrvcntion in haq on 'humanitarian nced'; Louis Henkin,
Columbia [,aw School, was morc circumspcct, and the issuc wa! whether Sccurity Council
Resolution 688 could bc interprctcd broadly enough to provide the prercquisitc 'hechsher'. (d.
Ncu Yo*T'nu, 19 Apr. 1991, A4).
fB Sclf imposcd limits on Statc rcvcrrignry or dctaao rcductions in sovcreign authoriry rhat
rcsult from various economic and political rurangcments arc not at issue here, though their
'voluntary' natune may oftcn bc in doubt.
te 
'UN and State practicc sincc t960 provider cvidcncc that thc intcrnational communiry
recognizcs only a very limitcd rigfrt to: external sclfdetermination, dcfincd as thc right of
frecdom from a formcr colonial power, and intcrnal sclf-detcrmination, defincd as indepcndcncc
of thc whole State's population from foreign intervention or influence.' Hannum, Aalonm1,
&oa.ig, aad Sclf-Dctanbnlion, alnve notc t l, p. 49. 'Sclf-dctcrmination is conccrncd wirh a
change in sovcrcign status and not with how sovcrcignry is cxcrciscd thcrcafter.' Harold S.
Johnson, St{-Dtatin"tin Wirtin ilu Cont tutitt of Natiottr. kyden; A.W. Sijthofi, l967.
The covenant of the League of Nations contained no recognition of
the principle of self-determination of nations. Further,'Positive fnter-
national Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such,
to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the
simple expression of a wish.'m The principle of self-determination is
not part of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is
only mentioned twice in the UN Charter, 'in the context of developing
"friendly relations among nations" and in conjunction with the
principle of "equal rights of peoples'."2r
The intervention of the United Nations for the sake of self-
determination of peoples began in 1960 with the adoption of the
Dcclaration on tlu Granting of Infupmdtrcc to Cobnial Countics and Pcoplcs.
That document was not aimed at the political rights of minorities, but
exclusively against the subjection of pcophs to alitn subjugation, that is,
against colonial regrmes in non-self-governing territories, and for
independence from oDcrscas rule. If the principle of selFdetermination
became recognized as a right by 1960, it was only with respect to
colonial territories r22 and even then only in a context in which ter-
ritorial integrity was considered the superior principle. African States
have been clearest in subordinating selGdetermination to the principle
m RrFa of ilu Intautioaat Connilta oJJuists Eattustd b1 tlu Council of tfu I-ague oJ NatiorLt with
thc Ttsh of Gioittg an Adoisorlr OprBin UF, tl" bgal Atfuts oJtht Aaload Islad fuution, l.caguc of
Nations, Of[.J.,Supp. No. 3 (Oct. 1920) at 5 as quotcd in Hannurn, Aubwml, Soocrcigntl aad &lt-
Dctmnhation, abovc note ll, p.29. For a discussion of Wilson's'Fourtccn PoinB'and thc
cnunciation of the principle of sdfdctcrmination of Nations, sce Charlcs Jr. Mce, The Ead oJ
Ordtr. Ncw Yorl: E.P. Dutton, 19fl). Wikon proporcd the principlc ofsclfdctcrmination bc part
of thc Covcnant of thc teague (though it was not), but evcn Wihon, in his proposal, madc the
principlc subondinatc to thc sovcreignty of Statcs. 'The peacc of the world is supcrior in
importanc! to cl/cry question of political juris.diction or boundary.' (Karl Jocef Partsch,
'Fundarncntal Principles of Human Rightr: SeJf-Dctcrminadon, Equality and Non-Discrimi-
nation', in Karcl Vasal and Philip Abton, Tlu li/,zruliorrr.l Dbuniont oJ Hmot &irta. Paris:
UNESCO and Westport, Gf.: Greenwood Prcrs, 2 vols., 1982 p. 63.) In reality, nations
achlcvcd sovcreign control only to the cxtcnt coruistent with unravclling old cnemy cmpires and
the stratcgic and political interests of thc victorious powen.2f UN Chartcr, arts. l, 55. Also Hannum, Aubnoml, Soocdgny nd &f-Detcrniruli.on, atrvc
notc ll, p.33. Bclgium (cf. UNCIO, Doc. VI, 29G) raised thc issue of the cquivocal usc of
'pcople' as collectivdy comprising all citizcnr of a rovcrcign State ard as a cultural nation.
Bdgium championcd the usc of 'peoplc' to rcfcr to the citizcns of a State lest thc chartcr justi$
intervcntion in the domertic alfairr of a Statc to champion a cultural nadon. This intcrprctation
was supponed by Haru KcLren, Tlu Lan of tlu Unitd Ndlillr.s, Ipndon: Stwens & Sonr, Ltd.,
1950. Thus, cquality of peoplca came to mean thc rcvercign cquality of all States.E Cf. Dcclaration on the Granting of lndcpcndcncc to C,olonial Countricr and Pcoplcs,
UNGA rcs. 1514, 15 UN GAOR, Supp. (no. 16), UN doc. A/4684 (1960). UNCA rcs. 2160(XXI), 30 Nov. 1966, couplcd with UNGA rcr. ??25 (XXI), 19 D€€- 1966, advocato cclf-
detcrmination of olonicr and suppon of national libcration movcments as not bcing an intcr-
vcntion in domertic sovcrrignty. The rtrolutions statcd two baric foundations for a lcgal ordcr-
thc territorial intcgrity of Statcs and thc rigtrt to sclf-dctermination of pcoplcs. In UNGA rct.
ly*l (XV), 1962, Southem Rhodcsia was dctermincd to bc non-sclJ:gqvcrning becawc it was
rulcd by a minority group; this poition was supponcd by thc UK whcn unilatcral indepcndcncc
*as dedared contrary to its earlier vicw that the UN had no compctcncc to dcal with irsucr sinct
Southern Rjrodoia vras sclf-goveming.
of territorial integrity. 'The whole task of national integration and
nation building may require the denial of the right to ethnic self-
determination in most territories as they emerge from dependency'.23
When the issue of self-determination within the context of 'friendly
relations among nations' was clarified in the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerned with Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations,2a it was also clearly located as part of decolonization.
The docurnent stated repeatedly and unequivocally, 'Nothing in the
foregoing shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember ar impair (my italics), totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States.'
However, though it went on to say that, 'Every State shall refrain
from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and territorial integrity of any other State' and that, 'The ter-
ritorial integriry and political independence of the State are inviol-
able', the principle of non-intervention was not absolute, but subject
to States, 'conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.'
Further, the restriction on intervention was applicable to other
States, not the United Nations itself. Thus, though the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention are supreme, they are not absolute
and unqualified. Th"y are subject to a State recognizing the principle
of equal rights of peoples within its domain and their rights to self-
determination without destroying the territorial integriry of the State.
Sovereignty and non-intervention are subject to maintaining p€ace
and friendly relations with neighbours. In any case, the principle does
not rule out United Nations intervention.s
Non-intervention refers to the restraint placed on other govern-
ments in attempting to intrude on the sovereign authority of the
government of a State. It does not mean restraint of a State to prevent
it from exercising authority within its borders against an attempt of a
minority nation within its borders to exercise its right of self-
determinaticin, given the rnonopoly on the use of such lorce conferred
on the State. The rule of non-intervention governs State to State
relations, not State to people relations.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait violated all three norrns in the most
6 Yilrna Ma.konnen, Intmutiout Inat @d tb Nao Slatet of Afria: A Sady oJ hilallrlliolrrl Lcgal
Pnblaw olSbtt Surrlsioai;r tlu Naoly lad4adatt Statls oJ hin Afria.Para: UNESCO, 1983, p.
462.& UNGA rcs. 2625, Anncx, 25 UN GAOR, Supp. (No. 28): UN dcr.. N5217 (1970).5 Unitcd Nationr Chaner, art,2(71 prccludcs UN intcrvcntion only in matters of dorncstic
jurisdiction of a State.
extreme sense possible. Iraq not only infringed the sovereign auth-
ority over the territory and the people of another State, but it con-
fiscated that territory and asserted its own absolute authority over
those people, and did so by force of arrns, without the consent of the
people. The rationale for that action was the denial that the Kuwaitis
were a separate people, with a legitimate right to make a distinctive
determination, and the further claim that the territory and its people
had been an historic part of Iraq, carved away by the interventions of
the nineteenth century irnperial powers, especially Britain.
Such a rationale is particularly fatuous when advanced by a State
itself the product of the dismemberment of an empire, carried through
at the cost of denying Kurdish self-determination. Unlike Iraq,
Kuwait was already a separate sovereign realm, though its borders
had not been properly demarcated. The issue for Iraq was not non-
intervention, the rights of sovereign authority or the self-determina-
tion of a people, but the argument that the Kuwaitis were not a
i
separate people at all.
Is the nation, a people, a product of State boundaries? Do State
boundaries produce distinct nations, or is it rather language and
culture cornmon to an entire population which is the only and
exclusive repository of political legitimary?s Which comes first, the
nation or the State? For Iraq, the answer with respect to its own
citizens, was the State, but for the people in the surrounding territory,
it was the Arabic nation that determines sovereignty. Quite aside
from the total illogic of this position, the Iraqi actions against Kuwait
again brought to the fore two fundamentally contradictory founda-
tions for modern State legitimary.
1.4 Nationalis6
Woodrow Wilson had espoused the fundamental nature of ulional
self-determination.2T States were to be carved out of the old empires
on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination. Where
s Walker Connor, ('Sclf-Detcrminarion: The Ne*, Phasc', ZO ioaa pott6, 30, 1967) dcfincs
the principle of sclfdctermination ar fiollowc: 'any peoplc, simply bccausc it considers itsclf to bc
a s€paratc national group, is uniquely and cxclusivcly qualificd to dctcrminc its own political
status, including, should it so dcrire, the right to its own State. Thc @nccpt, thcrcforc, mates
ethnicity the uldmatc standard ofpolitical lcgitimary.' (p. l I l-l l2) In my vicw, as shall bccome
clcar, cthnicity is nor the ultimatc, the unique or tlc cxclusive standard of political lcgitimacy. I
acccpt tlrc State ordcr as thc fundamcntat basis for political lcgitimacy rathcr than a national
order, but not an abaolute or unqualificd State systcm (d. Ian Bmr,rnlie, Pd,uipbt of fublic
IrLllutiorol law,4th cd. Oxford: Clarcndon kess, l99O; AlanJames, So*rcign Stauind. [,ondon:
Allen & Unwin, 1986), but one rubjcct to a rcspccr for minority righa, which in some m<ta
cntails a right to sccession and the lormation by t]rat cthnic group of thcir own State.
27 Thcre arc many scholan of both individualist and internationalist pcrsuasion who scc onty
desrrufiivcness and neg:ativity in nationalist movcments, usually without rccognizing the dcgrcc
to which thcir onn doctrines and bclicG arisc out of the history of their own nalion. Cf. Alfred
Cobban, Tlu Nation Suu aad Natwad Sct!-Dctaninatdon. Ncw York: Thomas Crowcll, 1969.
national minorities had not been given their own State, or could not
be included in States where they were the constituted majority, they
would be given certain guarantees of protection. This was to be a
fundamental premise of the League of Nations, but it was unwork-
able. The United Nations was founded on an alternative principle, the
sanctity of States, whatever their constituent memberships. It was to
be a system of States rather than irations, a system o[ rule-governed
and boundaried regimes each with a unit of membership in the global
State system.s Nations came to mean States.
No theoretical problem with this system would have arisen had the
united States of the world consisted of members who were nation-
States. But it did not. Many, if not almost all member States, were bi-
national, tri-national and multi-national. More importantly, most
ruled without the consent of even the majority population, let alone on
a basis which respected the rights of minority peoples.F
In the words of a popular song,so nationalism was a memory system
immune to the dominant ruling regime, The nationalist political
systems of the Cree and the Mohawk, the Welsh and the Scots, the
Basques and the Catalans, the Kurds and the Assyrians, the
Estonians and the Armenians, could be suppressed, but not the feel-
ings behind them. The State system of the world was, however, not to
be based on affects, but on a rational, cognitive system of well-defined
sovereign States with clearly demarcated borders and separate legal
regimes.
Part of the problem underlying the nationalist principle of the
League of Nations was not only its subordination to big power inter-
l
ests and the principle of sovereignty, or that various nationalities were
intermixed with one another in various ways, but that nationalism
seemed to be such an amorphous quality. On the one hand it was a
matter of language, culture and memory, o generally involuntary
process into which individuals were inculcated by birth. On the other
E What Craig R. Whitncy callcd thc 'hypocriry ovcr scllUctermination' (Ncw Yort Ttmts, 14
Apr- 1991, E2), bccausc thc United Nations cnshrined the'rcepcct for thc principleof cqual
rights and rclf-dctcrmination of fuph:.' (my italics) in thc United Nations Chaner,-is rcally the
acccptance of onc principlc, drastically subordinated to another, thc sanctity of sovcrcign Sntcs.
Humanitarian intervcntion is not to bc confused with intervention to support a seccssionist
movcmcnt or the right to selfdctermination.E A distinction murt bc madc bctwccn national sclfdctcrmination and sclfdetermination as
sclf-ru|c. One can havc cither without t}rc other, as in nationalist movements which rcrult in
indcpcndent Statcs under dictatorid rule. The contriurt with gclf-rule, for cr<ample, in Qucbcc,
whcre the nadonal group is pan of a dcmocracy which acctpts thc principlc of national sclf-
dctcrmination, but wherc that sclFdctermination has not as yct cxpresscd itsdf in a dctcrmina-
tion to cxercise full sovcrcign @ntrol.
s We carry in our hearts thc truc @untry,
And that @nnot bc stolen,
Wc carry in our hcarB thc true @untry,
And that cannot bc broken.
hand, nationalisrn was a matter of the will, not the heart, a matter of
consent rather than sentiment, where members of a single nation
accept a set of mutual rights and obligations towards one another.
Ultirnately, however, it became a political principle and an issue of
legitimization of and by the State which emerged with politicaljurisdiction over the nation.
In the new world, the consent theory of national membership based
on State noembership became predominant; inculcation into the
language, culture and memory system of the collectivity followedjoining the State. In this settler nationalism, the State develops
national pride and self-awareness. In the more traditional European
type of indigenous nationalism, the attempt to consolidate cultural
predominance over a specific territory governed by a single State
became the norm. The nation preceded the State and was its founda-
tion rather than the State becoming the instrument to forge a new
nation. There was a third version of nationalism-pan-nationalism.
When many members of a nation sharing a common language and
culture live in a wide variety of contiguous political entities, national-
ist movements frequently emerge which attempt to consolidate the
various parts into one, where the whole nation would be governed by
a single State. This has been the c"se of the pan-ltalian, the pan-
Germanic, the pan-Slavic and the pan-Arabic movements, all of
which frequently posed a direct threat to minority nationalities in
their midst.
Indigenous nationalism and pan-nationalism both make the
cultural-memory characteristic of nationalism primary. State
nationalism, a fourth typr which is a by-product of dtcolonization in
Africa and the denial of the national character of tribal culture, is like
settler nationalism; both make the consent basis of the nation pri-
Diry, even if the State, paradoxically, may exist to induce that
consent.
Thus, depending on the type of nation involved, the State system
was inherently unstable. Indigenous nations, in trying to consolidate
their power over a territory and to suppress and even eliminate
rninority nations in their midst, began to export their military might,
simultaneously using it as an emotive force to unite the members
within the State into a new, consolidated nation. This was the path
followed by the English and the French, the Italians and the Ger-
mans.
Settler nations, rooted more in consent theory and the doctrine that
it was will, and not a naturally inherited culture and memory, that
created the nation, were also unstable. In the extreme case, the
United States ofAmerica, there was no natural territorial boundary to
the exercise of that will. If indigenous nation-States became imperial-
ist to consolidate the national monopoly within the State, settler
nation-States became expansionist because they had no inherent or
historical boundaries within which to consolidate. Further, where
expansionism emerged as manifest destiny, then it acquired a built-in
rationale for the violent suppression of any attempt by part of that
newly created nation to break away. For fate and destiny demanded
the preservation and expansion of the State.
Pan-nationalists, by definition, were expansionist. Single nations in
the pan-mode lived in many States. Intent on including all nations
with a common culture within a single State, at the same time they
ignored and even denied the right of minority nations within their
midst to self-determination. This denial of minority rights reached its
apogee, not in pan-nationalist States, but in the States that emerged
at the end of the colonial era in Africa as they asserted sovereign
control over a membership frequently made up of various tribal
gfoups.
The Kurds were victims of a post-colonial State attempting to
create a common Iraqi nationality, in which the ideolory of the
dominant group was, paradoxically, pan-Arabism. At the same time,
many Kurds themselves espoused a pan-Kurdish nationalism which
directly challenged the integrity of the four contiguous States where
they made up some twenty million of the population. In Iraq, Turkey,
Syria and Iran, anti-Kurdish nationalism was the one factor which
united these otherwise disparate and conflict prone States. Finally,
some advocates of Kurdish autonomy, indigenous Kurdish national
movements within each of the States where they constituted large and
unassimilable minorities, simply demanded that they be members of a
State which (a) had their consent and, hence, legitimate authority
over its members, and (b) recognized their rights as a minority
nationality to protect their own language, culture and traditions. The
problem was that if one combined both a consent theory of nationalism
with a cultural basis for nationalism, then, as in the Quebec case, we
have the formula for a strong separatist and eventually secessionist
movement. It is very difficult ifnot impossible to reconcile consent azl
cultural nationalism, with its inherent propensity to demand full self-
determination, with the integrity of the sovereign State system.
In this context, the crisis of the Kurdish refugees emerged. The
settler States were unwilling to resettle the refugees because that
would give Saddam Hussein a post-war victory over a rebellious
minority. It would also disrupt the settler States, given the massive
forced migration of the Kurds and the lact that the settler States
perceived themselves already to be flooded with refugees seeking to
become Americans, Canadians and Australians. Without resettle-
ment guarantees, Turkey was unwilling to give the Kurds a safe
havenaven lor lear rt woulq tuel nauonallst asPrratlons ot tnelr own
11,000,000 Kurds. Caught in a traditional refuge of many fleeing
f r fie r it ld fir l ti nalist pi ations f h ir
populations, the mountains, exposed to the elements, the lack of fresh
water and food, Kurds began dytng by the hundreds and thousands.sr
But their plight was also exposed to the modern technology of tele-
vision, the instantaneous transfer of the images of their suffering. The
alfective sympathetic response was worldwide and very strong. The
elation and swget taste of victory for the allies was soured by a very
bitter aftertaste. The international world and, particularly the United
States, had to act.
2. Analysis
2. I lfurnnnitarian Intervention
The spirit of Professor Wheaton's original
tarian intervention in 1836 is maintained in the following
He acknowledged the principle as justiSing, 'interference when the
general interests of humanity are infringed by the excesses of bar-
barous and despotic governments'.32 Professor L. F. E. Goldie, Pro-
fessor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program
at the Syracuse University College of Law, best defined humanitarian
intervention as follows: 'Humanitarian intervention should be seen as
a gratuitous act to prevent the continuation of genocidal activities or
policies of foreign governments against minorities which are their own
and not the rntervenlng States'."" ln thls artlcle 'humanltanan lnter-
vention' refers to the wc of physicalforcc within the sovereign territory of
i i t s' 33 I i i ' it ri i
another State by other States or tlu Unittd Nations for the purpose of
either protcction or tlu proviion oJ cmcrgcruy aid to the population within
that territory. In other words, the purpose must be overtly humani-
tarian, whatever self-interests it fulfils for the States involved, and
those purposes may be either protection or relief or both. The agents
may be the United Nations itself or other States. The tool will always
include the use of military forces otherwise it is not properly
'intervention'.
Two separate and parallel major effors at humanitarian
assistances emerged to help the refugees within Iraq. The first origin-
tr 
'April is thc Cruelcst Month': Thc Flight of the lraqi Rcfugecs, RIogo R.F*, \'ol. XIl,
No. 3/4, March/April 1991.u fu quoted by and according to Richard B. Lillich, Hunorutarian Inlnwilion and ilu U^it d
Natpnt. Charlottcsvillc: Univcnity Prcss of Virginiq 1973, p. 25.
r3 Lillich, ibid., p. ,i6.s 
'Intcrvcntion is dcfincd in a broad scnsc alt the purposcful and calculated usc ofpolitical,
cconomig and military in-strumcnb by one countr). to influencc the domcstic politics or foreign
policy of anothcr country.' (Pctcr Schracde4 d. Inlaocalin i, lfu l9&)'s: U.S. Forcign Poliq in tlu
of humani-
conception.
ated in the United Nations; the second in the actions of Britain,
France and the United States. Only the latter could be properly called
an act of humanitarian intcflctttion.
The United Nations action took place under the auspices of the
Secretary General of the United Nations, who first sent Eric Suy as a
personal representative followed by Sadruddin Aga Khan, as an
'Executive Delegate' and leader of a United Nations Inter-Agency
Mission for the UN Humanitarian Programme, not just for Iraq, but
for Kuwait and the lraq/Iran and lraq/Turkey Border Areas, to
negotiate an ag'reement with Saddam Hussein. The second unilateral
effort, begun by Britain and France, initially against the protests and
resistance of the United States but eventually led by them, aimed to
set up a protected enclave in the north within lraq to provide security
for the largely Kurdish displaced persons. This was a clear act of
'humanitarian intervention' and not just an operation for the pro-
vision of assistance.
The two plans differed in a number of respects. The UN plan
covered all of Iraq. The American-led plan covered only the north.
Secondly, the Iraqi authorities agreed to the UN plan and signed an
agreement with the UN setting out the terms and conditions for the
provision of relief within lraq. In fact, the agreement specifically
states that it is a response to a rcquest from Iraq. The plan poses no
problem of unjustified intervention or infringement on the sovereign
rights of lraq. The Iraqi authorities denounced the American-led
plan, however, as an illegal infringement on Iraqi sovereign auth-
otity.tu Thirdly, the Iraqi agreement with the UN followed announce-
ment of the plan to create a secure enclave in northern lraq. In fact, it
was hurriedly signed on lB April 1991, two days after President Bush
announced that huge refugee camps would be built in northern lraq,
protected by American, British and French troops. One possible
inference is that the Iraqis were compelled, if not induced, to sign the
UN agreement lest the de facto infringcments on Iraqi sovereignty
otherwise be legitimized.
Fourthly, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Iraqi
government and the United Nations is directed towards the relief of
the entire Iraqi population; Kurds or Shiites are not specifically men-
tioned and there are no limitations in the preamble. Clause 1,
however, refers to the 'affected Iraqi cidlian population', but the
Third World. Bouldcr: Lynne Rienner Publishcrs, 1989, p. 2.) In thc naffow scnsc, it is the usc of
miliary fo.cc by onc State to intcrfcrc in the internal alfairs of another Statc. Thesc dcfinitions
rcfer to thc agents intcrvcning and thc tools uscd, but not thc purposc. Humanc or humanitarian
intervendon is a qualifier rcfcrring to the objcctive of thc intcrvcntion as bcing thc bcncfit of a
deprivcd group within the domcstic jurisdiction of thc State in which the intervention tales
placc.
t5 The Ncu York Timzt, lO Apr. 1991, A8.
reference seems merely to refer to those for whom the relief is most
important and urgent. The army is not excluded from receiving aid.
Further, clause I I specifically calls for thc humanitarian assistance to
be impartial for'all civilians in need', without any priority for Kurds
or those displaced or the degree ofneed, though clause 2 notes that the
Iraqi government welcomes the ffirt to promote the voluntary return
home of lraqi displaced persons and the humanitarian measures to
avert new flows. Clause 3 also refers to 'displaced persons', but the
clause is a restriction on the function of the aid received and not a
priority or focus of that aid; it is only to be used to provide for the
pcrsorcl (in contrast to collective) safety and humanitarian assistance
and relief of the displaced persons, clearly implying that no other form
of aid was to be given to the displaced population. Military and
political assistance werc clearly ruled out. So presumably was any
assistance in enabling a collectivity to communicate through the pro-
vision of a telecommunication system, a radio network or even pri-
mary education for the children. Further, Clause 9 provided that
humanitarian assistance and reliefwas to be 'provided sirrultaruowl2 to
the displaced pcrsons, rcturnccs as wcll as all othn populatiotts'. The Ameri-
can-led initiative was clearly focused on the displaced Kurdish
civilian population and was without restrictions.
Fifthly, the UN plan depends for its implementation on the
cooperation, logistical and financial support of the lraqi authorities
who are given responsibility for setting up relief offices, distributing
aid and providing the transport to return the refugees. In fact, Clause
12 makes specific provision for the lraqi military facilitating the safe
passage of emcrgency relief, a provision not inclined to induce any
Kurdish return. The American-led plan depends only on the Iraqis
staying out of the way. The American, British and French will deliver
the relief and provide the safety. The only common element in this
respect is that in both ffises, safety is to be the responsibility of
military authorities, thc American-British-French military in one case
and the Iraqi military in the other. The American-led plan envisions
the troops being replaced by a protective force under UN auspices.
There are a number of approaches to analyzing the two plans. One
is historical. What were the circumstances that led to the creation of
two such diverse approaches when the United States had presumably
become the single sup€rpower dominating the UN and the Security
Council? Was Sadruddin Aga Khan really totally unaware of the
American-led plan because he was cut olf from international news
during his intense negotiations with the lraqis? Was the West totally
unaware of his negotiations? Or was this a two track approach with
each side aware of the others actions. If the latter, were the two plans
intended to be complementary, or did the Secretary-General of the
UN disagree with the intrusion on Iraqi sovereignty entailed by the
AmericanJed plan?
What were the goals of the two different plans, quite aside from
their ostensible purpose of helping the refugees, since the UN plan is
specifically impartial with respect to aid for refugees and displaced
persons in distinction from others in the Iraqi civilian population and
does not exclude the military from receiving assistance?
What is the political and legal authority behind each of the plans?
Could Secretary GcneralJavier Pdrez de Cudllar authorize Sadruddin
Aga Khan to sign an agreement on humanitarian aid with the lraqi
authorities without authorization. But without the support of the
U.S., Britain and France, where would the voluntary donations come
from? Does the Secretary General have the financial and political
support for implementing such a plan if it runs counter to three of the
major players on the Security Council? More critically, why would the
Kurds return if the logistics and the security of the Kurds was to be
left in the hands of the Iraqi military?
The issues for the UN plan are practical. The plan poses no chal-
lenge to international theory and practice. The issues raised are
.whether the plan is clear enough, whether it is fair and whether it
could possibly induce any displaced pcrson or refugee to return given
the explicit role assigned to the Iraqi military. The plan initiated by
Major of Britain and Mitterand of France, and urged on by Ozal of
Turkey, and reluctantly eventually agreed to and led by the Ameri-
cans, raises much more serious questions in its search for a basis in
international law. Creation of a refugee enclave in the north, after a
peace treaty was signed, was clearly intervention in the sovereign
authority of Iraq. Javier Pirez de Cudllar questioned whether the
Americans, British and French could send troops onto lraqi soil
without the explicit authority of the Security Council. Security
Council Resolution 688, passed by a 10 to 3 vote on 5 April, con-
demned Iraq for its repression of the Kurds as a threat to the peace
and security olthe region and called for member countries to provide
humanitarian aid. It did not call for intervention or the use of force to
protect the Kurds. Yet this resolution was used as the basis forjusdry-
ing unilateral action and is the reference point for the U.S. State
Department justifi cation.
The action could no longer be justified as the responsibility of the
Americans, British and French as occupyrng powcrs since the peace
treaty removed that role for the allies.s The AmericanJed coalition
could also have based its position, but did not, on law rooted in
morality whichjustifies the use of force to ensure humanitarian go3ls.
!6 Thfu justification was uscd by Allan Gcrson, U.S. counscl to the Micrion to thc Unitcd
Nations.
The world seemed to be on the horns of a dilemma just as Europe
has been with respect to Yugoslavia in the latter part of 1991. As one
alternative, some form olinternational law is upheld which recognizes
the sovereign authority of States, while using economic and humani-
tarian pressure to allow an international agency, with the agreement
and eooperation of the sovereign authority, to provide humanitarian
assistance to all civilians in need. Humanitarian assistance would be
presumably undertaken under the obligation to provide relief, but no
protection would be provided to displaced p€rsons and refugees.
There would be few if any real guarantees for the security of the
displaced persons and refugees. A logistical and safety system would
be run by the Iraqi military, a system guaranteed to induce fear rather
than security in the minority groups who fled. In other words, a plan
designed to be irnpartial was most likely to benefit only the population
displaced by the UN authorized war effort and loyal to the Saddam
Hussein regime andwt serve the population of Kurds most in need. If
the UN plan is supported under the'obligation to provide protection',
it would seem a forgone conclusion that it could not achieve its
objectives.
The other alternative is tojustify a 'right of humanitarian interven-
tion' to protect threatened minorities, preferably under international
rather than unilateral auspices, but international auspices which
would be very difficult if not impossible to obtain given the current
make-up of the Security Council at the time and the urgency of the
situation.
Both plans were fundamentally flawed plans. The UN ptan might
provide relief, but it was unlikely to reach the target population most
in need, and undermined rather than provided for the safety and
security of that population. The AmericanJed plan did not seem to be
founded in internationallaw and practice and was unlikely to receive
endorsement of the Security Council. The 'obligation to protect', but
without guarantees for the security of the refugees, or the 'right of
humanitarian intervention' without the sanction of international law
and perhaps also with no long term guarantee for the protection of the
refugees either-these seemed to be the two opposite choices.
Though seemingly so opposed, in practice, the two plans were
closely tied together. The obligation to protect, provided relief but no
protection, and relief primarily to those who did not need protection;
this plan seemed to become operative only after the right to interven-
tion had already been in place, and possibly only as a device to
delegitimize it. On the other hand, the right to intervention acquired
some degree of international legitimacy and American leadership only
if it was to be replaced by an international effort.
The conclusion seems incontrovertible. The only plan that will
deliver relief and prokct tlu rcJugus and dkplaccd persot is the American-
led plan. Is there any way it can be reconciled with international law
and norms even if it is not given overt international sanction by the
UN? Does not any 'right of humanitarian intervention' make small
countries, remembering a history of imperial intervention, shiver in
their boots at the prospect of setting a precedent for great power
intervention? Even the other perrnanent members of the Security
Council, China and the former Soviet lJnion, given their own internal
problems and chronic weaknesses, cannot welcome the cmergence of
any right to intervention even if it is restricted to an obligation to
provide protection and relief without the consent of the sovereign
authority of thc State within which the relief was ro be provided. Can
unilateral action to provide humanitarian relief and protection by
some States in the 'internal affairs' of another sovereign State bcjustified on humanitarian grounds?




The two principles are not only linked in the particular context of the
Iraqi situation, but linked in theory as well. To have an obligation to
protect without a right of intervention would be like insisting that a
State was sovereign without giving it the monopoly on the use of
coercive power. On the other hand, whenever a State, both within and
outside its own jurisdiction, uses coercive power, the issue of political
legitimary is at stake. The way Iraq exercised and abused its right to
use coercive power within the territory and upon the people under its
own jurisdiction is directly related to the rights of other States to
intervene, but only to the degree necessary and required to correct the
abuse of that power and protect those affected, and only to the degree
that protection is necessary to prevent a threat to peace and security.
In other words, Iraq as a sovereign State, was lully within its rights
to repress the Kurdish rebellion without any intervention of any kind
from third parties. Unlike Yugoslavia, Iraq was not a federal State
with a minority constitutionally given some sovereign authority
within a clearly demarcated territory. It was fully within Iraq's power
to repress the Kurdish civilian population which backed the rebellion.
However, the repression invited andjustified the moral condemnation
of other States and international bodies, a condemnation which could
be accompanied by external actions (such as the continuation of the
economic boycott) to induce the Iraqi military and secret service to
cease and desist from their contemptible actions. But the lraqi
behaviour would not in itselfjustify military intervention. However,
when the repression or fear thereof was so great as to cause mass flight
and an exodus which not only endangered the lives of rhe men,
women and children in flight, but threatened the peace and security of
the surrounding States, those States, or their allies, or the Security
Council responsible for maintaining peace and security, would bejustified in calling for external humanitarian intervention. In other
words, the inducement of mass flight by the government of a sovereign
State, which also endangered the peace and security of the surround-
ing States, provides grounds for intervention, but a qualified interven-
tion, one which r€stricted the use of coercive power of the sovereign
State but not one which challenged the fundamental territorial
integrity of that State.sT
This position justi$ing limitcd humanitarian intervention is to be
distinguished from other positions absolutely opposed to humani-
tarian intervention. 'What a State did to them (its own nationals) was
its own business and beyond the reach of international law or any
legal outside intervention short of war. But there may have bcen an
exception to the rule. I{, it was said, a State treated its nationals in
such manner as to shock the conscience of mankind, other States
could then intervene, if necessary, by force, to protect the persccuted
nationals. This was called humanitarian intervention partly
because most if not all of them were motivated by political considera-
tions that had nothing to do with human rights, it is questionable
whether so-called humanitarian intervention was ever recognized as
an institution of the law of nations. It was certainly never so
recognized by the countries against which it was invoked.'s
John Humphrey, the distinguished Canadian elder statesman of
human rights, went on to say that, 'The controversy (over the use of
force for humanitarian intervention), however, is now of historical
interest only, for jurisa who would now attempt to breathe life into
the institution are faced with an insurmountable di{ficulry. By Article
2 (4) of the United Nations Charter all member States have pledged
sr 
'As1idc 2(a) (of thc Unitcd Nations Chartcr) rayr exactly what it rayr-that you shouldn't
u.sc forcc to affcct t}e tcrritorid intcgrity of a State. I thint this has bccn rcconfirmed in thc
dcdaration of nonintcrvcntion. (GA Rcs. 2131,20 UN GAOR Supp. 14, 1965)'(Jocph B.
Samucls in Lillich, above notc 32, p. 43). This objcction rcfcrs to affccting 'thc tcrritorial
intcgrity of t}lc Statc', but not to an intcrvention dcarly aimcd at t}c protcction of a minority
population and o<plicidy not at thc tcrritorid intcgriry of that State. An. 2(4) rhould nor bc
confuscd with thc rcjection of thc use of force acrws Statc lincs undcr any ciro.rmstancts; thc
issuc is what arc the circumstancca?
s.John P. Humphrey in Lillich, abovc notc 32, Forw'ard. John Stuart Mill (c[ I{icha€l
rNalzcr,Jul aad U4jutl |l/ars: A l{ont Argnaloilh Hfuonal llhntlaliotts. New Yorl: Basic Bools,
1977, pp. 87-91) malcs a similar argumcnt.'We are to trcat Stater as sclf-detcrmining conr'
munities, hc (Mill) arguct, whcthcr or not thcir intcrnd political arrangcmcne arc frec, whcther
or not thc citizcns choosc their govcrnmcnt and opcnly dcbatc the policies carricd out in rhcir
name. For sclfdctcrmination and political frecdom are not equivalent terrrur . . . A State is sclG
dctcrmining evcn if its citizcns strugglc and fail to cstablirh frec institutions, but it has been
dcprivcd of sclfdctermination if such institutionr are establilhcd by an intrusivc ncighbour' (at
P.87).
themselves to refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integriry or political independence
of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations. This exdudes any recoursc to humanitarian
intervention, involving a threat or use of force, by any State or com-
bination of States apart from the United Nations itself.'
If no State had the right to engage in humanitarian intervention,
did the United Nations have that right? Professor Frey-Wouters, then
o[ the Political Science Department of the City University of New
York, recommended that, 'in the absence of Security Council
authorization, collective direct military action should be avoided'.se
Does the authorization have to be explicit, or could it be implied,
which is what the United States did with Resolution 688? Further,
why is unilateral as opposed to multilateral action not justified?
Professor John Norton Moore argued that, 'some unilateral com-
petence is required if carefully constrained'.s He went on to elaborate
that, 'There will be at least some circumstances in which effective
multilateral action will not be available when needed. For one thing,
the issues frequently arise in an emergency. Secondly, they frequently
arise in a politicized context. For these and other reasons it is unreal-
istic, for the short run at least, to feel we are going to get effective
multilateral action in all circumstances when it is needed. If we are
going to have effective humanitarian action, then it must be at least
partially unilateral . . . Such interventions should only be permissible
in situations of extreme deprivation.'ar
More importantly, 
" 
question even arises whether the United
Nations itself has any right to intervene forcibly in the affairs of States
even on humanitarian grounds. The difficulty resides not in Article 2
(7) of the Charter, which precludes any intervention by the United
Nations 'in matters which are essentially within the domesticjurisdic-
tion of any State,' because it can no longer be argued that violations of
human rights 'which shock the conscience of mankind'are essentially
within domesticjurisdiction. The difficulty lies rather in the fact that
nowhere does the Charter authorize the United Nations or any of its
organs to tucforcc (my italics) against a State unless there is a threat to
the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. And i[any of
these conditions can be shown to exist, there would be no need for the
United Nations to have recourse to any doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, for-assuming that thcre was unanimity between (sic!)
the permanent members of the Security Council-the United Nations
could intervene on other more peremptory grounds.'42
Lillich, abovc notc 32, p. t07.
Ibid., p.49.
€ lbid., p.30.{2 lbid., p.49.
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What Humphrey failed to recognize is that humanitarian interven-
tion would be distinctively different in its goals and methods than
other threats to the peace as instantiated by the very unique and
different precedents created within months of one another in the use of
force to repulse the Iraqi invasion, occupation and annexation of
Kuwait and the use of force to protect the Kurds. One requires very
aggressive military action; the second begins with a very defensive
posture. Further, the fint required the overt sanction of the Security
Council. The second might only require its silence and the absence of
condemnation of the use of force by other States to protect the Kurds.
The latter sets a precedent by omission. Thus no new legal mechan-
ism is needed, such as an amendment to the Charter, nor is a new
legal hook needed when the threat to peace is sufHcient in the limited
case here.
In addition to the position opposing humanitarian intervention by
other States even under limited circumstances for very defined and
qualified purposes, there is a position advocating broad powers of
humanitarian intervention. This position would justify humanitarian
intervention for any significant and extensive breach of human rights
by a State against its own population. This is the position of Fernando
Tes6n. Tes6n go€s much further in broadening the purposes of
humanitarian intervention because, 'The normative force of the
principle of State sovereignty is thus put to the difficult test in those
instances where it clashes with our firm belief that individuals are
entitled to claim fundamental human rights as moral barriers against
the State.'as Ffe then defined humanitarian intervention to suit his
own conception as, 'the proportionate transboundary help, including
forcible help, provided by govcrnments to individuals in another State
who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would
be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive governments.'s
His justification was that any State that so oppressed the human
rights of its citizens had forteited its legitimacy. 'Because the ultimate
justification of the existence of States is the protection and enforce-
ment of the natural rights of the citizens, a government that engages
in substantial violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for
which it exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimary, but its
international legitimacy as well.'45
Such a doctrine reverberates with justifications for colonial inter-
ventions by colonial powers to protect their own citizens. It is a
doctrine subject to conspicuous abuse. Richard A. Falk of the
Princeton Law School stated that position very torcefully. 'I am very
{t Fernando R. Tcs6n, Hunmhrian Intcnattion: An laquir1 hlo Ino ad Moraliy. Dobb,s Fcrry,
N}': Transnational Publishcn, 1988, p.4.s lbid., p.5. 15 lbid., p. l5
sceptical about the sensitivity of principal governments to the values
at stake, the consistency of that sensitivity, so as not to feel comfort-
able about giving lcgal sanction to the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention under contemporary conditions'.6 Professor Brownlie seemed
to be of the same position. 'My position is that humanitarian interven-
tion, on the basis of all available definitions, would be an instrument
wide open to abuse . .. as a matter of degree, the definitions of
humanitarian intervention are woefully slack. Moreover, thc safe-
guards attached to thc definitions seem unworkable. Does a force sent
in to halt racial oppression or the practice of slavery remain until the
legislative and administrative structure maintaining the particular
condition has been changed?'47
However, Brownlie was not as absolute as this quote makes him
appear. 'The only threat to the general international consensus
(against the use of humanitarian intervention to justify the use of force
within the territorial realm of another State), is the opinion that the
principle of selGdetermination has modified the law relating to the use
of force in various ways'.s In other words, in addition to at least an
implicit authorization by the Security Council, the intervention
should take place in some relationship to the principle of self-
determination of national minorities within States.
If a contemporary right of intervention is to be linked with an
obligation to provide relief and protection, it must directly deal with
the issue of legitimacy. In fact, it is precisely because modern political
theory has been unwilling to challenge the absolute authority of the
State to use coercive power within the territory under its jurisdiction
and against its own populations, to delimit when it is and when it is
not legitimate to use such power, that a major if not the major cause of
refugee flows is not tackled. The root cause of refugees is nol economic
underdevelopment, but the abuse of the monopoly of coercive power
by the State on individuals and national minorities within the borders
of the State's purportedly absolute jurisdiction.
The fact is, States are interdependent. That interdependence has
been utilized in the past to develop a refugee regime in which other
States picked up individuals ejected from a State when that State
hiled to fulfil its social contract to its members who gave up the use of
coercive power in return for protection. That interdependence may
have only developed as an obligation in practice when the world was
totally divided among States and there no longer existed a 'state of
nature', that is, a territory in which a State had not yet claimed
sovereign authority, where the individual could begin again. In other
6 Lif lich, above note 32, p.33.
a7 Ian Brownlic, 'Thoughtr on Kind-Hcancd Gunmen', in Lillich, above note 32, l3$-14g, at
p. 146. $ Ibid., p.r44.
words, the current refugee regime is a product of the spread of the
sovereign State system over the whole earth where some sovereign
States do not live up to their obligations to protect their citizens and
govern without @nsent. But it is no longer a workable regime. The
threat to the integrity of all other Statcs is too real. The numbers cast
off are too large, particularly when those who are not protected are
not just selected individuals but large minority nations.
Further, States were not only based on providing protection to
individuals so they could op€rate in the civil sociery. They were also
lounded to give rights to national collectivities. The fiction that a
State was in a state of nature with every other State and that the only
proper international legal regime was one of contracts between States
which provided no rights of intervention in each others affairs can no
longer be sustained. How a State treats its own individual citizens and
minorities affects the viability of every other State. What is proposed
is that the very same basis upon which the modern theory of the State
was constructed-the obligation to provide protection-is the very
same basis upon which the right to intervention can be justified, but
then only in very qualified ways and by properly legitimized actors.
This does not mean domestic jurisdiction will be conflated with
international jurisdiction, that the exact same norms that govern the
conduct of States within its domestic jurisdiction will govern the
conduct of States outside its jurisdiction.ae There will be different
nonns covering the two areas and di{Ierent principles of legtrtimiza-
tion. The right to intervention will be very restricted and only
recognized in cases where the State bothfails to protect its own citizens
and that failure jeopardizes the peace and security of other States. In
other words, the legitimization of intervention is built on current
understandings of State to State relations, rather than on their
replacement with a radically new conception. Such a rationale for
intervention go€s far beyond the pressures of moral influence
exercised by international human rights advocates. They use moral
influence not force, and their actions are based on solid documen-
tation; it is not intervention as we have defined it.
Similarly, such a rationale for humanitarian intervention is to be
distinguished from those who recognize a transnational obligation to
provide protection but without any right to intervention. The latter
justifies agreements between legitimate international agencies and
States, but without providing the international agency with an effec-
tive basis for the use of coercive power.
As Professor John Norton Moore stated the problem: 'Surely the
€ 
'A Statc's actioru outsidc its tcrritory, and against non-citizcnr, must bc oraluated in terms
of t-he political justification ttrat grantr the Statc thc rigtrt to opcratc domcrtically.' Lca
Brilmayec,Justafriag Inhulioflal Ads, Ithaa, N.Y.: Corncll Univcrsiry, p. 2.
issue is whether we are able to develop a set of criteria for normative
appraisal, so that we can detcrmine when humanitarian intervention
is normatively permissible, and when it is not. That is, what kinds of
governmental actions, in mistreating one's own population or in inter-
vening, should be impermissible'.s
Thus far, the following restrictions or constraints have been intro-
duced on the right of intervention:
l. The right is only to be used to provide relief and protection, and
for no other purposes;
2. The right is only to be used when the use of coercive force by a
sovereign authority is so extensive as to induce mass flight;
The right is only to be used when that mass flight is so extensive
as to threaten the pcace and security of the region;
The right to intervention is only to be exercised when it is
authorized cithn by the immediately adjacent State whose
security is threatened by the mass exodus or when it is explicitly
endorsed by the Security Council.
There are many possible objections to recognition of such a right. For
example, it may be argued that such a right ofintervention.is wrong in
principle; or that, even with the restrictions provided, the right is cast
too broadly; or that the right is cast too narrowly.
2.5 Casting tbe Net Too Brmdly
The case against too broad an application of humanitarian interven-
tion has been acutely summanzed as follows: 'The instinct to act
forcefully where misery is imposed by a human agency is often more
intense than in the case of natural disaster, since compassion is rein-
forced by righteous anger. Yet, many decent men hesitate. Why?
First, because where the good Samaritan must fight for the right to
perform, he may end up causing more injury than he averts. Secondly,
because the authorization of forceful intervention for humanitarian
intervention may be abused: This is the problem of the thief in good
Samaritan's clothing. Third, because unilateral recourse to force even
for genuinely humanitarian purposes may heighten expectations of
violence within the international system and concomitantly erode the
psychological constraints on the use of force for other purposes'.5|
The right to intervention, even if it is restricted to instances of mass
flight to the degree necessary to provide relief and protection so that
those in flight can return to their homes in safety, may be cast too
broadly because it would justi$ intervention in too many countries on
the pretext that the peace and security of surrounding States is
s Lillich, abovc nore 32, p.3{1.5l Tom J, Farcr, 'Humanitarian Intervcntion: Thc View from Charlottcsvillc', in Lillich,
abovc notc 32, p. 152.
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threatened. It might even justifu intervention in the former USSR and
China, although it is unlikely that any foreign power would be likely
to exercise such a right today even if it could be justified in terms of
both morality and international law and practice. As depicted above,
interventions might also be justified in Afghanistan, [ran, Sri Lanka,
Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia and Mozambique. A major factor con-
tributing to refugee flight in some of these States, however, has been
outside intervention. Moreover, outside Powers do not have the caPa-
city to intervene in all these cases, and it is unlikely that any interven-
tion could be limited to relief and protection for the refugees and
displaced persons.
Only one ground offers a sufficiently justifiable basis for interven-
tion-the protection of minority populations. The flight of refugees
from Afghanistan because of an ideological dispute, the accession to
power of a fundamentalist religious regime in lran and the ensuing
mass flight, would not warrant intervention on the basis of current
political theory and international law and practice; this would require
truly reconstituting a new world order, a possibility discussed below.
The exodus of refugees from Cambodia, because of the extreme horror
occasioned by the accession to power of a millenarian terrorist regime
might justify intervention under the Genocide Convention, but that
requires separate exploration.
The only grounds for exercising a right to intervention is the recog-
nition olthe right of a people to self-determination. That recognition,
in the post Second World War period, does not mean that interven-
tion by outside parties is justified to support that right to self-
determination exercised through the use or support of a rebellion
against a recognized State authority. A State retains the monopoly on
the use of force. A minority may rebel against that monopolization of
force, and force as well as any other factors may deterrnine the out-
come. The right of a minority to self-determination does not alonejustify intervention; what justifies intervention is,
o the use of coercive lorce by the State authorities on the civilian
population;
o the use of force to such a degree that it causes a mass exodus; and
o the resulting mass exodus is a threat to peace and security.
In other words, two theoretical principles of the modern State system
come into play-the right of national minorities to self-determination
and the right of States to protect themselves. The mass exodus of that
minority would effectively cancel ficrever the possibility of exercising
the right of self-determination. But that alone would not justi$ inter-
vention, a right in modern political theory which is not based on
humanitarian principles. A mass exodus of the Mohawks from
Canada would not justify the intervention of the United States into
the a{fairs of Canada, or, if Quebec becomes independent, t}e inter-
vention of Canada into the internal affairs of Quebec. The protection
of a minority population, with an inherent right to sel-fldetermination;
is a necessary condition to justify intervention, but not a sufficient
mndition. An actual threat to the peace and securiry of the adjaceut
State would have to be established and invoked tojustifr intcrvention.
How would we differentiate a case which alleges a threat a.nd one
which produces a real threat? How do we establish that the threat to
peace and security is not a pretext? We do it by way of limitations on
the intervention-by restricting the objectives to the provision of relief
and protection of the population in flight enabling them to return to
their homes. But we need another restriction to ensure these restric-
tions are adhered to. If the initial intcrvention does not occur under
international auspices and with the use of international forces, the
intervening forces should be replaced, as soon thereafter as feasible,
by an international police force.
We have thus added two further restrictions, one which qualifies
those occasions of mass exodus that justify intervention to those situa-
tions in which a mass exodus of a minority population is occurring.
The exercise of power which causes a mass exodus of the civilian
population, such that the demand for the right to self-determination is
eliminated once and for eU, would abrogate the right of self
deterrnination ar a ight altogether.
The second restriction qualifies the conditions of such intervention.
It must be followed by a genuine effort to replace the intervening
troops of another sovereign State as soon as possible with an interna-
tional police force. In that way, the intervening power(s) receive no
benefit from such intervention other than the preservation of peace
and security.
There are five constraints on the external involvement in the
domestic affairs of other States, other than constraints of Realpolitik,
such as strident and effective regional opposition or the forceful
opposition of major powers, such as the Soviet Union and China.
They include: an implicit support of an international body; a minimal
use of force; a restriction on the duration of the intervention; a restric-
tion that intervention only take place in cases where minorities are
under a perceived threat; and there is a mass exodus which is a threat
to the peace and security of the region.
The intervention does not and must not be so extensive so that it
fulfils a criterion of altering the regime of the State in which interven-
tion occurs as Farer advocated. 'Rescue, if there is to be any, will
require etmination of the threat at its source. The delinquent elite
must alter its policies or be removed. There must, in other words, be
direct and sustained involvement in the political process of the target
State.'5? There need not be this direct and sustained involvement. A
combination of the carrot of allowing lraq to export oil again (critical
if the Ba'th regime is to retain power) and the threat of continuing
presence of foreign troops and the possibility of further intervention,
can serve as a method of sidestepping the need for a long occupation
or the removal of the elite from power. In other words, initial forceful
intervention backed by other non-force measures might together miti-
gate the danger that Farer describes and thinks is inevitable.
Do the above grounds justifi intervention where we might
otherwise believe it was unwarranted? For example, would theyjustiS the invasion of Palestine by five Arab Statcs to prevent the
partition of Palestine? After all, the Irgun had allegedly slaughtered
over 200 men, women and children at Der Yassin, panicking the Arab
population and contributing to mass flight and exodus. A minority
nation in the partitioned portion of Palestine that was to become
Israel fled in massive numbers, and one cause was attributed to an
unjustified use of force.
Intervention would not be justified. First, plans for the intervention
were in process prior to the instigation of mass flight. Secondly, the
strongest arrny in the five nation pact, that ofTransjordan, intervened
to abrogate the self-determination of the Palestine people, not to
hcilitate its exepcise.ss Thirdly, the intervention took place contrary
to the expressed will of the UN; the partition plan of the UN would
have provided for the self-determination of the Palestinian people,
although on only part of the territory which they claimed. Fourthly,
the intervention took place expressly to prevent the self-determination
of another people, the Jewish minority in the territory of Palestine.
Finally, the intervention did not take place for humanitarian reasons,
to provide relief and protection for the fleeing population, but to settle
a political dispute in favour of one of the sides.
Ajustification for Arab intervention might be provided if the Israeli
extreme right came into powcr and instigated a forcible transfer of the
population from the West Bank across the border with Jordan. Inter-
national intervention would be justified to provide relief for the fleeing
population and for their protection within the West Bank, but not to
settle the political dispute, even though the intervention did not occur
within the sovereign territory of Israel but on disputed territory where
the ultimate disposition had not been finally determined in
accordance with international law and mutual agreements.
52 lbid., p. 173.
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Oxford: Clarcadon Prcss, 1984, P. 538.
Would international intervention be justified in Sri Lanka to pro-
tect the Tamils. No. Because the actions of the Sinhalese government
have not induced aflurss exodus. Large numbers fleeing a civil war are
not to be equated with the forced expulsion of a whole minority in fear
of massive, indiscriminate slaughter. Intervention might have beenjustified in Ethiopia or even in Kampuchea as a case of genocide.fl
The rationale above would certainly notjustify the American inter-
ventions in the Dominican Republic, in Grenada,s5 in Lebanon and in
Panama. They would not be cases of humanitarian intervention.
whether it would justiS interventions on hurnanitarian grounds in
theCongo,s in Nigeria,ut of Tanzania in Uganda, particutaily in light
of the even wor:se atrocities committed by the Obote regime,s I leave
open to question.
2.4 Casting the Net Too Narrowly
The above sets forth a doctrine of the right of intervention based on
current international theory and practice and on the premise of
sovereign States and their responsibilities towards one another. It has,
admittedly, very restricted grounds for application. There are those
who would argue that such grounds are so restrictive that it becomes,
in effect, an apologia for only one intervention.s Further, a right of
intervention which justifies unilateral irrtervention by any State
merely opens a pandora's box for abuse and future conflict. The right
must be based on international, not unilateral action, under prop€r
legal authority. Further, the right of humanitarian intervention must
be based on the need to protect the rights of individuals and not just
on the obligation to protect minorities who have begun to leave en
masse. In fact, it is not properly called a right of intervention but an
obligation to provide protection. The issue is not whether the interna-
tional system may intervene, but that it truut intewene. It would apply
to the Cambodian slaughter of its own people, to the viciousness of the
s Scc Bazyler, 'Stopping thc Blmdshcd: Thc Doctrinc of Humanitarian Intervcntion Rc-
cxamincd in t}e Light of thc Atrociticr in Kampuchca and Ethiopia', StaatordJounul of lalaaa-
tiorul LaD, lW7.$ Cf, Wi[iam C. Gilmorc, Tlu Grcaada Istttzcntim: Au$sis ad Dawnbtdol. London:
Msrucll Publishing Lirnitcd, l9&*.$ Cf. Wcisbcrg, 'Thc Congo Crisir of l98f: A Casc Study in Humanitarian lntervcnrion',
VirgiaiaJo$rral ol laauioul Lao (19721, p. 12.
5t Cf. Wcisbcqg, 'Humanitarian Intcrvcntion: Lcrsons from thc Nigcrian CiwlWar', Hunan
RighaJ*nul (1971).$ Cf Michacl Richardson, AJtcr Anh, tfu Bldl Pcarl. Atlanta: Majcstic Book!, 1980.s Defcndcn of broad groundr for intcrvcntion includc A. D'Amato, Intautioul l^oo: Prruss
ad Praspd (1987); Michad Rcisman 'Coercion and Sclf-Dctermination: Construing Artidc 2
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ffin P,rblit Atlain 169 (1979-80); Lca Brilmrycr, Jutiftitg Intenadoul ,{ar. Ithaca: Cornell
Univcrsity Prcss. 1989.
Idi Amin and Obote regimes in Uganda,tr to the genocide ofJews by
the Nazi regime. It is a doctrine which challenges the theory that the
only remedy against an authoritarian rights abusing regime is a
domestic one dependent on the right to rebel of the people themselves,
but not on any outside authority and does so not because the conse-
quences of those abuses are a threat to the peace and security of the
area, but directly because the rights of the State's own citizens are
being violated.
Post World War II human rights approaches focus on either civil
and political rights,(rights of the individual to be protected from the
excesses of the State,) or on social and cconomic rights, that is group
entitlements. These protections and entitlements tend to ignore
minority or communitarian rights rooted in theories of national self-
determination. Such communitarian rights are matters of both protec-
tion and entitlement.6l
Those who argue for broadened grounds for humanitarian inter-
vention, however, base their case on the narrow grounds of a universal
code of individual rights rather than on any principle of cornmunity
rights. The argument depends on the premise that the relationship
between a State and the individual members of that State, whose
rights are being violated by the very State set up to protect that
individual, cannot be insulated from outside interference. The issue of
human rights, they argue, does not fall solely within the sovereign
rights of States. As the Foreign Minister of Argentina argued at the
UN Commission on Human Rights, 'The preservation of human
rights was a legitimate interest of individuals and groups that went
beyond the sovereignties and powers of the States and was also of
concern to the international commnnity'.u'
Nevertheless, humanitarian intervention, in the form of force to
protect those whose human rights have been abused, has not been
broadly supported. Though human rights do not fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of a sovereign State, the form of intervention to
protect the rights of others has not thus far extended to the use of
coercive ficrce by outsiders to defend those rights.
Just as parents do not have absolute authority over a child, but a
State has the right to intervene when a parent abuses a child because
of the primary obligation of that State to provide protection, those in
f;avour of a broadened right of humanitarian intervention argue that
tr Cf. Famoq Hassan, 'Rcalpolitik in Intcrnational Law: Aftcr Tanzanian-Uganda Conflict,
"Humanitarian Intcrvcntion" Rccxamincd,' l7 l{tltancttc l-au Rtoirw 859 (Fall, l98l).6r Cf. Frcdcrict Harhofi 'Institutioru of Autonomy,' 55 Nmdic Jamal oJ launational Lal,3l
( t986); Hannum, Autonom2, fuaaigilf ad &lJ-Dcumiaatia above note I l.e Foreign Ministcr of Argcntina, UN Commission on Human Rights, UN doc.
E/CN.4/1984/SR.29 (1984).
an outside transnational body has an obligation to provide a similar
type of protection. State authority cannot be so absolute as to give to
that State the right to abuse its own members. The sovereignry of a
State merely protects that State from intervention by awthcr Statc. But
that State is a rnember of the community of nations and has respon-
sibilities, including responsibilities to its own citizens, which it is
obligated to carry out. When that State fails, when it abuses that
obligation, a trannwtional bod2 has a duty to provide protection and,
hence, the right to intervene.
The obligation to provide protection, in this case, entails an obliga-
tion to use force agairct a State which abuses the rights of its citizens,
not under the laws of that State, but according to universal norms of
human rights, adherence to which are conditions for membership in
the community of States. This is the basis for who intervenes (a
transnational actor) and the grounds for intervention (abuse by a
member State of the rules of membership in the transnational auth-
oriry).
The problem is that the rules of membership also exclude any such
remedy as the right of intervention. The only rule justifying interven-
tion is a threat to peace and security or, perhaps, massive genocidal
actions. The abuse of individual rights of individual citizens is not
normally a threat to peace and security. The precedent of the Nurem-
berg trials against Nazi war criminals cannot be invoked because they
involved neither a right to humanitarian intervention nor an obliga-
tion to protect, but an obligation to punish those who, by their
aggressive actions, have f;allen outside strict domestic jurisdiction and
under the authoriry of the victorious powerc.
Can the debate over a State's rights and the obligation of supra-
national authority to intervene in that State to protect the equal rights
of all its citizens provide a model justi$ing humanitarian interven-
tion? This might 6e based on threi assu*plions:
l. the perpetrator of violations, the State, is a member of the United
Nations is intervenor and subject to its rules;
2. the victim is a member of the intervening State;
3. the independence rights of the abusing State are subordinate to the
obligations of the United Nations towards those who have been
abused.
Only the first premise is, in fact, true if the doctrine is to be applied to
the intcrnational realm. Individuals are not members of international
bodies no matter how much transnational bodies are charged with
protecting the rights of individuals. The second premise begs the
question. Further, the second premise fails to point out a qualification
of membership-the sovereign authority of a State over its own
citizens and territory, ruling out any right to intervention. The key to
justifring international intervention by a transnational authority
depends on hro missing elements, the nature of rnembership and the
entitlement to exercise the right of jurisdiction, neither of which is
applicable in this case.
The construction of a basis for a broader theory, based on
individual rights and individual membership in the world community
and restricted to intervention by a properly authorized international
actor, encounters too many problems. There are practical difficulties
in involving an international authority in too many disputes where it
lacks the tools to intervene effectively when the use of force is
required, and where the politics of the organization create obstacles to
intervention. Even in the most extreme cases, such as counteracting
the apartheid regime in South Africa, only moral inftmu and cconomit
prcsnre could be used, There is no theoretically coherent justification
for intervention in the broader sense of protecting individual human
rights. Only the combination of the rights of a nation to self-
determination combined with the doctrine of threat to peace and
security as outlined above provides such a justification. Though a
right to humanitarian intervention for non-State actors has developed
to justify protection by agencies such as the International Red Cross,
it is always based on the concurrence of the allegedly abusing State
and full recognition for its sovereign authority. It is not based on any
qualification to that sovereignty which permits the use of coercive
power to protect a threatened minority on its own territory. 'Critics of
humanitarian intervention did not question the need for action both
in cases of massacre and of the chronic mutilation of a whole people.
What they did question was the need firr a specific legal doctrine
keyed to such events'.6s Why we need a theoretical basis is precisely to
prevent humanitarian intervention from being abused and, at the
same time, to differentiate the actions appropriate to humanitarian
intervention as distinct from those needed to repulse aggression.
2.5 The Principle of the Right of Humanitarian Intervention
There are those who, however sympathetic to the plight of thc Kurds,
would argue that a right to intervention, however restricted and quali-
fied, sets a precedent for leading the world community into uncharted
and dangerous waters. More importantly, however, it is theoretically
unjustifiable.
The government of Iraq demonstrated its ability to ensure control
over its territory and over its own citizens, the only condition flor
grving it legitimate authority. Consent of its citizens is not a condition
for legitimation, let alone respect for individual and/or minority
6 Farcr in t.illiqft, abovc note 32, p. 158.
rights. Further, the opportunity and occasion for intervention fol-
lowed the Iraqi defeat in an intcrnatiorul dispute, whatever the lraqis
deemed it, where the intervening States on behalf of Kuwait and the
old world order were much more powerful than Iraq. The tlumctical
basis for a humanitarian right of intervention is premised on States
with equal status in the international community.
Jurisdiction depends on the mastery of the instruments of coercive
power alone and not on the effects of the use of that power on a State's
own citizens. It does not depend on whether the State is exercising the
authority it has been given in a legitimate fashion to protect its own
citizens. The adjudication as to whether that authority has been
exercised legitimately and the resort to a challenge to that coercive
power are both responsibilities only of its own citizens.
The above rationalizations of absolute and unqualified sovereign
power and authority of an existing regime are but legal and theoreti-
cal legal fictions. They are no longer operable. All kinds of interven-
tions are currently justified based on State to State contract theory,
including all kinds of penalties, such as trade restrictions and boy-
cotts, the latter being one form ofan act ofwar. Sovereignty has already
been qualified in the Helsinki accords and in the boycotts on the South
African regime, but they have never entailed the use or threatened use of
force on the territory ofa sovereign State to protect a group ofits citizens
from thc actions of that State.e The issue is not absolute sovereign
power, but one form of qualifying that power which go€s a step further
than any actions to date. And it does so not by analogy with the State's
own right to protect its citizens from each other, but by reference to
existing terms of the contracts between State actors.
Implicit in international relations is a contract obligating each
State to limit its own sovereign authority to use force to reinforce that
authority when it does so in such a way that it denies the right of a
national minority even to exercise its right to self-determination (as is
entailed in a mass exodus) and, at the same time, threatens the peace
and securify of surrounding States. 'Humanitarian intervention as
distinct from war, seems to me to have something to do with the
specificity of the objective and with limitations on magnitude and
duration of the undertaking'.s
6r This rs not quitc true. Thc case of thc Indian action in Eeqt Pakistan in l97l providcr a
prccedcnq cf, Rizvi, Hasan A:tari, Intcraal SHI, d Extdrul Intauntioa: Ittdi6\ RoL h th. Civit
War h hst Pakbln (BagMtth). Lahorc: Prqgrcssivc Publisherr, 1981. A! Walzcr puts it, 'Thc
Indians wcrc in and out of the country so guinlrly, ddcating t}te Palirtani army, but not
rtplacing it, and imporing no political controls on tlre emergent Statc of Bangtadeh': Just ottd
Urgjul l|aq above note 38, p. 105. After thc UN'r hilurc to do anything about thc'appallirrg
brutalitics' and massive violation of human righB' that tooh place in Frqj Palirtan, the lntcrna-
cional Commiarion ofJurists justificd thc Indian ncsporurc undcr the doctrine of humanitarian
intcrvcntion (1972, p. 96). 6 Richard A. Falt in Lillich, abovc nore 32, p.27.
The obligation o[a State party to the l95l Geneva Convention and
the 1967 Protocol not to rcfouh an individual refugee qualifies that
State's sovereign authority. For that State agrees to surrender the ngfu
to determine who can enter and stay on its sovereign territory, and a
right to stay can be founded on the basis of international rather than
national rules. But if a refugee producing State becomes so ethically
deviant that, as a result of its exercise of sovereignty, thousands arc
driven to seek sanctuary in a neighbouring State, then the asylum
State will only be able to maintain its own sovereign authonty and its
duty to protect refugees, a qualification of that sovereignfy, if the
influx is not overwhelming. To maintain its own ethical position and
ensure its sovereignty, the asylum State is entitled to intervene and/or
call on others to assist it to intervene to prevent a mass exodus.
The rationale for intervention in this paper does not go that far,
though such a doctrine could be constructed on the basis of State to
State mutual responsibilities. The doctrine of the right of humani-
tarian intervention has been restricted to the cases of the mass exodus
of a minority nation which already has a right to self-determination,
where the ability of the minority nation to exercise that right is limited
by the jurisdiction of an existing sovereign State. In other words, two
factors are at work justilying humanitarian intervention; the right of
other States to selfprotection, not only for their physical being, but for
their integrity and moral responsibility; secondly, the recognized right
to self.determination of large national minorities within the borders of
the offending State.
Further, unlike intervention based on a theory of individual rights
and the responsibilities of non-State or transnational actors, this right
to intervention is limited, since it does not challenge a State's
sovereign authority over the territory and people underjurisdiction; it
restricts how and when it can exercise that authoity onQ after it has
demonstrated a gross abuse of sovereign pou/er. It is also broader,
since it justifies the threat of the use of force by intervenors for very
restricted purposes and over a very restricted territory.
Thus, as in the realist critique of this theoretical rationale for
humanitarian intervention, and in contrast to transnational, cosmo'
politan and some individual rights theorists, the State is considered to
be the principal actor in international affairs. But the State is not an
actor with absolute jurisdiction in its own domestic sphere and no
jurisdiction whatsoever in the domestic sphere of other nations. Its
domestic sovereignty is qualified, however limited that qualification
rnay be. And its jurisdiction within the sovereign realm ofother States
and its right to intervention is also very restricted, in the objectives,
the means utilized and the circumstances justiSing intervention.
